Introduction
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-Firms that operate in or seek to enter the telecommunications industry facẽ Z the choice of investing in a wide variety of competing technologies that will | provide them with necessary digital infrastructure. These technologies range from Digital Subscriber Lines (xDSL) based on existing twisted-pair wires g available through local telephone exchanges, to technologies based on •S communication satellites, to Gigabit Ethernet, ATM, Fiber Distributed Data fe Interface (FDDI), cable modems and Fast Ethernet, along with other newly 0 emerging technologies. Firms face a severe tension concerning investment 1 incentives in this environment. On the one hand, technical uncertainty limits <3 the amount and focus of investment that any one firm can undertake. On the jj other hand, firms that do not invest in technologies that eventually succeed J risk being locked out of the market. We will argue that this tension is particularly strong in industries such as telecommunications that have substantial network externalities.
In this paper, we examine how firm size affects the incentive to invest in digital infrastructure projects in environments that have substantial network externalities. We suggest and show empirically that a firm's rate of growth first declines and then increases with the size of its user base. Therefore, firms may benefit from making investments in emerging digital infrastructure early enough to achieve a substantial user base and to gain that user base before other firms' investments pre-empt them. Beyond some minimum scale, the investment incentives tend to increase as a firm's user base grows within a set of digital services. At the same time, though, the same network externalities that sometimes give rise to high growth rates may severely limit growth following investment in unsuccessful technologies. This tension underlies strategic choices in network industries.
In the next section, we define network externalities, discuss various sources of network externalities, and outline the expected effects of network externalities on firm growth rates. We then describe the results of an empirical examination of the relationship between firm size and firm growth rates. The analysis examines the size-growth relationship in three industries that have substantial network externalities. We conclude with a brief discussion of the strategic implications of the results, which concern alliance strategy and investment incentives for firms of different sizes.
Network Externalities
A network externality is said to exist if the utility that a user derives from the consumption of a good increases or decreases with the number of other agents that consume the good (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) . A network industry is an industry in which there are significant network externalities. Economists such as Cunynghame (1892) and Pigou (1929) have long recognized this phenomenon, although economic research-other than Liebenstein's (1950) use of bandwagon and snob effects within a theory of demand-has paid little attention to network externalities. It was not until the early 1980s that Carlton and Klamer (1983) and Oren and Smith (1981) developed the empirical importance of network externalities in the electronic funds transfer and telecommunications industries. Saloner (1985, 1986) and Kat2 and Shapiro (1985, 1986) then provided key conceptual understanding of the role of network externalities in neoclassical economic theory. Network externalities have also played a role in organizational theory, meanwhile, typically through the mode of bandwagon effects and legitimization. 732
Sources of Network Externalities
Four main sources of network externalities arise in the economics and organizational theory literature, including direct physical effects, bandwagon effects, complementary goods and legitimacy effects. As we discuss below, more than one source of network externalities may apply to a particular case.
Direct Physical Effects. On-line services provide an example of direct physical effects. The utility that a consumer derives from joining an on-line information service such as America Online or Prodigy depends on the number of individuals, firms and organizations that have joined the network. The size of the user base is analogous to the number of nodes connected by the network (Conner, 1995) . The simplest example of a network is the simple star network that characterizes the network of telephones. A phone call from user X, to user Y, routes through a series of switches S x and S r In such a network, increases in the number of users increases the utility of all participants in the network. Because individual users ignore the benefits or harm that they provide to other users when they join or leave the network, such networks provide sources of network externalities. Many industries, such as the telecommunication industry in general and the online services industry in particular, are examples of network industries in which direct physical links are a source of network externalities.
Bandwagon Effects. Network externalities may also result from the desire of certain individuals to be in style (Leibenstein, 1950) . The bandwagon effect refers to the extent to which the demand for a commodity increases due to the fact that others are consuming the same commodity. Examples of commodities that create bandwagon effects include the demand for designer jeans, and the demand for internet access via ISDN, Tl or xDSL. The bandwagon effect represents the desire of people to purchase goods in order to conform with the people they wish to associate with or in order to be stylish.
Complementary Goods and Services. Network externalities can also arise for products that require the presence of a complementary good or service. For instance, an individual or organization contemplating the purchase of a computer will be concerned with the number of other individuals and organizations purchasing compatible hardware. This concern arises because the variety and amount of software, which is often the essential complement, that will be supplied for use with any given computer platform is an increasing function of the number of compatible hardware units that have 733 been sold. In the case of personal computers, the large installed base of computers that use the Wintel architecture allows the software makers to exploit economies of scale. This in turn results in a greater variety of software being written for Wintel-based computers. Such externalities often take the name of indirect network externalities. The complementary source of indirect network externalities often arises with the emergence of de facto standards. De facto standards emerge when the benefits of network externalities are so great that a technology or design may dominate in terms of market share, creating what users and producers acknowledge to be a standard Saloner, 1985, 1986; Shapiro, 1985, 1986) . Standards that emerge in this manner are referred to as de facto standards because they emerge as a result of competitive market forces, rather than through de jure imposition by a public agency (David and Greenstein, 1990) . The complementary source of network externalities sometimes explains the failure of new technology to displace existing standards. Postrel (1990) provides the example of quadraphonic sound, which failed to replace stereophonic sound in the 1970s because of the lack of fully compatible software such as records that provided the quadraphonic format, even though quadraphonic sound was technologically superior to the older stereophonic sound. Network externalities may also arise for a durable good when the quality and availability of after-sales service for the good depends upon the size of the service network, which in turn depends on the number of units of the good that have been sold (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) .
Externalities that arise from direct physical effects, bandwagon effects and from indirect complementary goods can occur jointly. For example, in the case of cellular phones, as more consumers subscribe for cellular services that are compatible with the GSM (Global Standard for Mobile Communications) standard, the utility of each existing GSM subscriber directly increases. Furthermore, complement makers will have added incentives to design products that are specific to the GSM standard. This, in turn, provides GSM subscribers with indirect externalities. Moreover, consumer desires to maintain current consumption styles may also create bandwagon demand for cellular phones as the number of users increases.
Legitimacy Effects. The benefits that organizations derive from organizational legitimacy also may provide a source of network externalities. Institutional theorists predict that the growth in the number of organizations belonging to a new organizational form will lead to increased social and political acceptance (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987) . Numerous ecological studies (e.g. Hannan and Carroll, 1992) suggest that an 734 increase in the number of organizations conveys legitimization in the sense that an organizational form gains the status of being taken for granted. This taken for grantedness increases the founding rate and survival chances of organizations within a given form.
In an emerging industry, an increase in the size of the user base of a firm that belongs to a particular organizational form will provide legitimacy to all firms that belong to that particular organizational form. This is similar to the institutional theory arguments regarding organizational legitimacy that arises in ecological research (e.g. Barnett and Carroll, 1987) . While ecological researchers have focused on the effect of legitimacy on factors vital to the firm, such as founding and failure, the effects of legitimacy may be considered the equivalent of an indirect network externality that will affect growth rates. While legitimacy effects are likely to result in network externalities at early stages of many industries, we will focus the analysis in this study on industries in which the first three sources of network externalities tend to arise.
In order to see the effect that network externalities have on firm growth, we will review the impact of network externalities from the demand side. Network externalities primarily influence the demand for a product. Thus, in the presence of positive network externalities, an increase in the size of the user base increases the value of the product and therefore increases the demand for the product. These benefits may result from physical, bandwagon or complementary network externalities. For example, as more complements become available with increases in the size of the user base, consumers face lower switching costs that result from having multiple suppliers of the complement. Furthermore, the presence of multiple suppliers may also reduce consumer concerns about potential post-purchase opportunism by a single supplier (Farrell and Gallini, 1988) . In an industry that incurs direct network externalities, such as the telecommunications industry, an increase in the size of a firm's user base increases the value of its user base to its consumers. This, in turn, makes the firm more attractive to future consumers and increases the firm's growth rate. Thus, the theoretical literature on network externalities suggests that firm size will tend to lead to increased firm growth.
Empirical studies of firm size and growth do not demonstrate the positive relationship that network externality theory suggests. Instead, the body of studies that have examined the relationship between firm size and firm growth rates have found that firm growth rates tend to decline as firms get larger. While some researchers have sought to explain the observed negative relationship between firm size and firm growth rates as an artifact of econometric biases, more sophisticated research has shown that the negative relationship persists even after controlling for the various econometric issues. 735
Some non-econometric explanations for the observed negative relationship between size and growth remain possible, such as the nature of firm learning (Jovanovic, 1982) and the irreversible nature of investments in capacity (Cabral, 1995) . Nonetheless, the dominant empirical conclusion of largescale, multiple-industry studies is that firm growth tends to decline with size or, at best, is stable with respect to size. A limiting feature of the conclusion concerning the size-growth relationship, though, is that prior studies tend to assume that a unique growth process holds for the entire size distribution of firms across a broad range of industries. However, there is no reason to assume that all firms in all industries should follow a similar growth process. The increasing importance of the so-called 'high-technology' industries, which tend to have network externalities, suggests that growth patterns may well vary from industry to industry. The traditional results may tend to arise in industries that do not involve substantial network externalities, while the opposite relationship may arise in network industries.
In this paper, we predict that growth rates first decline and then increase with firm size in network industries. We note that firm size provides many benefits to firms that operate in network industries, leading to a positive relationship between firm size and firm growth. However, the positive benefits from network externalities often accrue to the firm only after its user base reaches a critical mass. Thus, as in all industries, a young firm grows rapidly if it successfully navigates the difficulties of early competition. In non-network industries, a firm's rate of growth tends to slow down once the firm has reached a minimum efficient scale. However, in network externality environments, we expect that once the firm's user base reaches a critical mass, which will typically be a size greater than the minimum efficient scale, the firm's growth rate will tend to increase as the firm begins to reap the benefits of network externalities. Thus, we expect to find that growth rates decline and then increase with firm size in network industries. We believe that a firm's rate of growth is an important predictor of both current and future profits for the firm, as well as a key determinant of firm survival in dynamic industries.
Of course, the benefits from network externalities will not increase monotonically for all firm sizes. Once a firm establishes its products in the marketplace, additional increases in user base are unlikely to increase a consumer's valuation of the product by as much as prior increases added to value. Furthermore, a market leader's vulnerability to competitive threats constrains the leader's ability to extract rents from consumers. Thus, growth rates are unlikely to increase monotonically with firm size. However, 736
investigating the second-order effects of firm size on growth rates is beyond the empirical scope of this paper.
Methods and Measures
In order to empirically test our prediction that firm growth first declines and then rises with firm size in network industries, we examine the relationship between firm size and firm growth rates in the semiconductor, prepackaged software, and computer communications equipment industries. Each of these three industries is characterized by network externalities because products in each of these industries require the presence of a complementary good. The value of a semiconductor chip depends on the cost and availability of software and hardware that is tailored to that particular platform. For example, Digital's Alpha chip tended to be faster than the comparable Intel Pentium chips that were available at the time. However, the wide availability of software tailored for the Intel chips and the paucity of software tailored for the Alpha chip contributed to the Pentium chip's success in the marketplace.
A similar argument applies to the computer communications equipment industry. The sources of network externalities in the computer communications equipment industry include the availability of trained professionals and the availability of software that is tailored to a particular hardware product. For example, CISCO, a leading provider of networking hardware such as routers and LAN switches requires software tailored to its hardware product. As CISCO'S user base increases, a greater variety of hardware will become available for its hardware products, giving users an incentive to purchase products that others are using.
For the prepackaged software industry, the sources of software network externality include a desire to economize on post-purchase learning costs and to share files easily with others. For instance, the typical spreadsheet program is a complicated productivity package that may require many hours or days to master. By using a program that others are using, individuals are able to take advantage of direct avenues for economizing on learning costs, such as tutorials and guidebooks, which tend to become available more abundantly and cheaply as a program's user base increases. Furthermore, software programs such as computer games often incur bandwagon effects.
We use a regression approach to test our prediction that firm size will have a U-shaped relationship with firm growth rates. We use a longitudinal research design and index all variables in the regression equation for both firm segment (/) and time (t). Using a pooled cross-sectional notation, the following equation describes the growth relationship: 737
In the equation, S 1 , -^ +1 represents the size of firm segment / in period / + 1, X,_, is a vector of independent control variables, d represents the time between each observation and »,_, is normally distributed with mean \i.t and variance a 2 t. We calculated growth rates on an annual basis, so that d takes on value 1.
We examine the growth rate of a firm's business segments, which are industry-specific lines of business, rather than examining the growth rate of each corporation. Given the existence of diversified firms in many industries, we decided to use a segment-level size measure rather than a firm-level measure because the segment-level measure is more consistent with the conceptual sources of network externalities. We used continuously compounded growth in sales to measure increases in size. Over shorter time periods, growth measures that are based on variables such as employment and assets are likely to be sticky. On the other hand, growth measures based on sales will demonstrate greater year-to-year change than the stickier measures of size such as assets or employment. Furthermore, as firms continually redefine their boundaries by engaging in activities such as outsourcing, sales are a better measure of firm size than assets or employment.
We collected the segment sales data from the Business Information File (BUS) produced by COMPUSTAT. The BUS file provides information for all publicly traded firms identified at the four-digit SIC level, disaggregated for up to 10 different industry segments for the period 1978-1996. Across the three industries, we obtained information for -1000 businesses with almost 8000 firm-year combinations.
The literature on network effects suggests that the size of the installed base affects firm performance (Hartman and Teece, 1990; Conner, 1995) . In order to estimate the installed base effect, we measured the size variable by cumulating segment sales over a 2-year period. In order to test for the expected non-monotonic relationship between size and growth rates, we included a quadratic term of firm size as an independent variable in the regression. We expected the coefficient of the size variable to be negative and significant in each of the three industries, and the coefficient of the square term to be positive and significant in each of the three industries. In addition to the independent variables we also included business-level control variables for age and business focus, as well as environmental controls for industry concentration, industry growth, and density.
Finally, we also explored the possibility that the results were biased by attrition of segments in the sample. Mansfield (1962) notes that if the probability 738 of firm survival increases with firm size, then the observed negative relationship between firm growth and firm size may stem from the higher failure rates of slow-growing, small firms. To control for sample selection bias, we used Lee's (1983) generalization of Heckman's (1979) two-stage sample selection estimation process. For each industry, we created a data set that pooled the yearly observations on each firm segment. While one can reasonably assume that growth across firms is independent of growth across firm segments, it is unlikely that growth within the same firm segment across time periods will be independent. Thus, the error term in a pooled cross-section time-series model is likely to correlate serially. In order to remedy this problem, we included dummy 739 variables to account for the effects of omitted variables that were specific to the individual firm segments but stayed constant over time, and the effects that were specific to each time period but stayed constant over all firm segments in the period. This approach is called the least-squares dummy variables (LSDV) approach or the two-way fixed effects model. An alternative approach to the serial correlation problem is to treat the individual and time-specific effects as random variables. This approach is the random effects model. We used both the fixed effect and random effects approaches in the analysis. However, the results of the Hausman test and the Lagrange multiplier test indicated that the random effects model and the ordinary least-squares model did not fit the data as well as the fixed effects model. Thus, we only report results for the fixed effects models that we used in the estimation of the growth equation. Table 1 presents the results of the statistical analysis we conducted to test the prediction that there is a U-shaped relationship between firm size and firm growth rates. Our prediction received strong support in each of the three network industries. Table 1 shows that growth rates decline as size increases, until a threshold size is reached, after which growth rates increase with size.
The central implication of the result for firms operating in a network externality environment is to underline their need to build a large user base as quickly as possible. Thus, firms have an incentive to make early investments in emerging technologies in order to achieve a large user base. Furthermore, beyond some minimum scale, the investment incentives tend to increase as the firm's user base grows.
Conclusion
The finding that business growth eventually tends to increase with size, once past some minimum point, in network externality industries has strong strategic implications. The central implication of our study is that firms have a special incentive, over and above the investment incentives in non-network industries, to make early investments and thereby attempt to achieve a large user base in an emerging technology. So long as there is some finite limit to market demand for a good, the first firms to gain substantial sales growth will tend to attain lower costs and be able to pre-empt later investors from achieving potential growth. Therefore, firms face substantial incentives to invest early enough in the hope of gaining a substantial user base before other firms' investments pre-empt them.
We will briefly discuss two additional implications of the results, concerning alliance incentives and investment incentives for different types of 740 firms. First, the growth-size relationship in network externalities contributes to incentives to undertake alliance strategies in network industries. The alliance incentive arises from two causes: technical uncertainty and the basic sources of network externalities. In part, the alliance incentive arises when the flip side of the growth-size relationship in network industries combines with the presence of substantial technical uncertainty. The flip side of the growth-size relationship in network industries is that firms that invest in unsuccessful technologies will tend to achieve even lower growth than in unsuccessful investments in non-network industries. That is, customers will be particularly loath to adopt network externality products that do not fare well in the market. This risk is often substantial, as technical success in network industries commonly depends on competition among multiple core technologies as well as uncertain development of complementary goods. Thus, firms in network industries tend to face a severe tension. On the one hand, firms risk substantial losses if they invest in technologies that fail. On the other hand, firms that wait for one or more technologies to dominate others risk being too late to invest successfully. This tension will often create particularly high competitive turnover in industries that face both ongoing technical change and substantial network externalities. The tension between investment uncertainty and growth incentives contributes to the incidence of strategic alliances in network industries, as firms seek to share investment risks.
In addition to alliance incentives that arise from technical uncertainty, several factors that arise from the sources of network externalities also contribute to the frequency of alliances in network industries. Alliance strategies may include letting other firms clone or license your technology, entering into alliances with other industry incumbents or allying with firms that possess necessary complementary assets (Axelrod et ai, 1995; Conner, 1995) . Alliances often provide immediate critical mass in sales to help achieve the network externality benefits of direct physical effects and the bandwagon effects of consumption. Alliances provide access to a range of capabilities needed to develop focal and complementary goods, where the capabilities are often well beyond the scope of any single firm. Moreover, alliances among competing and complementary firms may reduce organizational diversity in emerging industries and thereby increase the legitimacy of the existing organizations. The firms entering into an alliance relationship seek to balance their interest in building a user base with their desire to control the technology in order to extract rents. The strategy of entering into vertical and/or horizontal alliance relationships is often the only viable strategy for startup firms or diversifying entrants seeking to enter an emerging industry. 74! Although alliances are common in network industries, firms sometimes attempt to dominate a new market by making independent investments. Independent investment is often coupled with penetration pricing whereby the firm prices its product below cost in the early stages of the product's lifecycle in order to gain user base. However, the decision to make independent investments in building a user base is typically a perilous route for the firm, given that consumers take into account the expected size of the network while making their buying decisions. Firms making independent investments to build a user base must frequently overcome technical constraints and legitimacy concerns in order to market products that are systemic in nature. Furthermore, the firms often lack access to complementary skills that they require for the product to attain its full value. A widely cited example of a failure of this strategy is Sony's decision to market its Betamax format video system independently. Typically, then, large firms seeking to establish new technologies for existing services in which they have an established presence in the marketplace the strategy are most likely to make substantial independent investments in building a user base.
Finally, the results suggest a key refinement to our traditional view concerning the relative investment incentives of small and large businesses and, similarly, of industry incumbents and industry entrants. We often think that small firms and industry entrants have the most incentive to invest in new technology, in order to challenge large incumbents. In this traditional view, established leaders often have lesser incentives to invest in new technology, both because they may have reached their growth limits and because they pay more attention to protecting their existing technical positions rather than expanding beyond them. However, in industries that incur network externalities, such as the telecommunications sector, firm size and incumbency may encourage new investment rather than discourage it. The incumbent investment incentive may be particularly strong when the emerging technology provides existing services, such as internet access via xDSL or ISDN. In such cases, incumbents risk rapid displacement if entrants gain the growth benefits of network externalities before them. In addition, however, incumbents face the same investment incentives as any other firms when faced with new technology that provides new services, such as cellular services in emerging economies. Indeed, to the extent that their incumbency provides organizational legitimacy or access to complementary goods that contribute to network externalities, incumbents may have greater incentive than entrants to invest, even in cases of new services. Therefore, industry incumbents are likely to undertake major investment roles in network industries. This paper examines how firm size affects the incentive to invest in 7 42 infrastructure projects in environments that are characterized by network externalities. We suggest and show empirically that a firm's rate of growth first declines and then increases with the size of its user base. Therefore, firms may benefit from making investments in emerging technologies early enough to achieve a substantial user base and to gain that user base before other firms' investments pre-empt them. Moreover, beyond some minimal scale, the investment incentives tend to increase as a firm's user base grows within a set of digital technologies.
